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Genetic Discrimination
Torben Spaak*
1. INTRODUCTION
Scientists have been quite successful in their attempts to
map the human genome, the genetic information stored in the
approximately 20,000-25,000 genes that humans are said to
possess.1 Stephen Scherer describes the ramifications of the
Human Genome Project (HGP):
With the success of the HGP, we have overcome the psychological
barrier of cracking nature’s code and now face the more daunting
responsibility of having power over the genetic destiny of our own
species. As such, the HGP joins the ranks of the other massive
undertakings of the 20th century — splitting of the atom and the
conquest of space — in transforming civilization. And, just as
Galileo’s work was foundational to proving the Copernican theory
which debunked the notion that the earth was the centre of the
universe, the HGP proves there are human-to-animal DNA sequence
links, thus substantiating Darwin’s theory that we are not a unique
life form. With this information, the HGP promises to give us
profound knowledge as the basis to understanding how our minds
work, to be able to quantitate nature and nurture, and increasingly,
to be able to alter our genetic constitution.2

Information about a person’s genetic make-up will make it
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(last modified Oct. 27, 2004).
2. Stephen Scherer, The Human Genome Project, 2 CAN. J. POL’Y 11, 1819 (2001).
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possible to predict his or her health and perhaps even his or her
behavior to some extent.3 Employers and insurance companies
may want to base their decisions on genetic information, and,
in some cases, they might even require employees or
policyholders to undergo genetic testing.4
Some commentators argue, however, that access to genetic
information may give rise to discrimination, and that
individuals need legal protection against such discrimination.5
I argue, to the contrary, that although individuals may need
legal protection against access to genetic information, this is
not because such access may give rise to discrimination, but
because it may give rise to stigmatization or other harmful
consequences. For example, a person with a genetic condition
may be denied employment or health or life insurance precisely
because of his or her genetic condition.
This article begins with a discussion of the important
possibilities and risks stemming from access to genetic
information. I then present a case study said to show that
genetic discrimination is manifested in many social institutions
in the United States. I argue that the study does not really
identify discrimination, but rather “immoral incompetence” by
those institutions. I then analyze the concept of discrimination
and its relation to the principles of the Rechtsstaat, arguing
that discrimination violates these principles. I proceed to
consider and reject the idea that access to genetic information
3. For more on the impact of a person’s genes on his behavior, see
BEHAVIORAL GENETICS (Ronald A. Carson & Mark A. Rothstein eds., 1999).
4. See, e.g., Nancy E. Kass, The Implications of Genetic Testing for
Health and Life Insurance, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND
CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 299 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997);
Mark A. Rothstein, The Law of Medical and Genetic Privacy in the Workplace,
in GENETIC SECRETS, supra, at 281.
5. See, e.g., Paul R. Billings et al., Discrimination as a Consequence of
Genetic Testing, 50 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 476 (1992); Lisa N. Geller et al.,
Individual, Family, and Societal Dimensions of Genetic Discrimination: A
Case Study Analysis, 2 SCI. & ENG’G ETHICS 71 (1996); Wendy Lovejoy, Note,
Ending the Genetic Discrimination Barrier: Regaining Confidence in
Preconception, Prenatal, and Neonatal Genetic Testing, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 873
(2001); Tara L. Rachinsky, Comment, Genetic Testing: Toward a
Comprehensive Policy to Prevent Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, 2 U.
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 575 (2000); Kimberly A. Steinforth, Note, Bringing Your
DNA to Work: Employers’ Use of Genetic Testing Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 965, 968 (2001); Statens Offentliga
Utredningar [SOU] 2000:103 Att spränga gränser. Bioteknikens möjligheter
och risker [government report series] (Swed.).
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on the part of said actors may give rise to the broader harm of
“geneticism” understood as “the use of genetic notions to
privilege some individuals and subordinate others.”6 The
article ends with a brief discussion of the harmful consequences
that may result from access to genetic information by
employers, insurance companies, and others. Among other
things, I point out that the absence of discrimination does not
mean that, morally speaking, everything is all right.
2. GENETIC INFORMATION
What is a gene?
explanation:

Stephen Scherer offers the following

Genes are instructions that give organisms their characteristics. The
instructions are stored in each cell of every living organism in a long
string-like molecule called Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA). DNA
molecules are subdivided into finite structures called chromosomes . .
. . Each organism has a characteristic number of chromosomes. For
humans the number is 46 (23 pairs) and this complete set of genetic
information is called the genome.7

Thus genetic information is information about the
biological material (the DNA), not the biological material
itself.8 This conception of genetic information is consistent
with the ordinary meaning of information, and it is also
interesting from a moral or legal point of view.
Much of the debate about the risks stemming from access
to genetic information is premised on the assumption that
genetic information is different from other health information
and that access to it is likely to create unique problems.
Lawrence Gostin, for example, maintains that genetic
information is special in the following ways:
The sheer breadth of information discoverable; the potential to unlock
secrets that are currently unknown about the person; the unique
quality of the information enabling certain identification of the
individual; the stability of the DNA rendering distant future
applications possible; and the generalizability of the data to families,
genetically related communities and ethnic and racial populations.9

But not everyone agrees.

Rejecting arguments that

6. Susan M. Wolf, Beyond “Genetic Discrimination”: Toward the Broader
Harm of Geneticism, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 345, 345 (1995).
7. Scherer, supra note 2, at 12.
8. See Sonia Le Bris, Give Me Your DNA, and I’ll Tell You Who You Are .
. . or Who You’ll Become, 2 CAN. J. POL’Y 90, 92 (2001).
9. Lawrence O. Gostin, Genetic Privacy, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 320, 326
(1995).
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describe genetic information as “distinctive and especially
sensitive,” Thomas Murray concludes that genetic information
is not so special because genetic information is “neither unique
nor distinctive in its ability to offer probabilistic peeks into our
future health.”10 He further argues that concerns for kin are
unconvincing because even though these concerns may “amplify
the sensitivity of genetic information, it does not render that
And the concern about genetic
information unique.”11
discrimination is not persuasive, he explains, as genetic
information is not unique in this respect either.12 According to
Murray:
Genetic information is special because we are inclined to treat it as
mysterious, as having exceptional potency or significance, not because
it differs in some fundamental way from all other sorts of information
about us. Portions of that mystery and power come from the
opaqueness of genetic information, the possibility that others will
know things about the individual that he or she does not know, and
how genetic information connects the individuals to immediate family
and more distant kin. The more genetic information is treated as
special, the more special treatment will be necessary. Yet none of
these factors is unique to genetic information.13

Murray is right. While access to genetic information by
various social institutions may constitute a threat to the
individual, the same could be said about all forms of medical
information. Nevertheless, we need not hold that genetic
information is special, let alone unique, in order to worry about
the consequences of access to such information by various social
institutions. It suffices to observe that genetic information is
difficult to handle.
3. GENETIC DISCRIMINATION: A CASE STUDY
Paul Billings and his coauthors have conducted a series of
tests to determine whether access to genetic information may
give rise to genetic discrimination.14 More specifically, the
1992 study aimed “to discover whether incidents which may
reflect genetic discrimination are occurring in the workplace, in
10. Thomas H. Murray, Genetic Exceptionalism and “Future Diaries”: Is
Genetic Information Different from Other Medical Information?, in GENETIC
SECRETS, supra note 4, at 60, 64.
11. Id. at 65.
12. Id. at 65-67.
13. Id. at 71.
14. Billings et al., supra note 5, at 477.
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access to social services, in insurance underwriting, and in the
delivery of health care.”15
The authors contacted 1,119 New England professionals
working in “clinical genetics, genetic counseling, disability
medicine, pediatrics, and social services” and asked about
incidents of “possible genetic discrimination.”16 They received
forty-two responses. They excluded thirteen of these responses
because the incidents reported did not meet the authors’
criteria for genetic discrimination or were insufficiently
informative. The remaining responses described forty-one
incidents of possible genetic discrimination. Thirty-two of the
incidents involved insurance, seven involved employment
issues, and two concerned other matters.17 The authors
concluded that discrimination is manifested in many social
institutions, especially in the fields of health and life insurance.
Specifically they stated:
Problems with insurance companies arose when individuals altered
existing policies because of relocations or changes of employers. New,
renewed, or upgraded policies were frequently unobtainable even if
individuals labeled with genetic conditions were asymptomatic.
Assessment of the natural history of the genetic condition or
evaluation of the fitness of the individual by physicians had little or
no influence on the adverse outcomes presented by the respondents.18

However, this important study is marred by the authors’
insufficient attention to the analysis and definition of concepts.
In particular, they failed to define the concept of
discrimination. To be sure, they defined the concept of genetic
discrimination as “discrimination against an individual or
against members of that individual’s family solely because of
real or perceived differences from the ‘normal’ genome of that
Furthermore, they distinguished genetic
individual.”19
discrimination from “discrimination based on disabilities
caused by altered genes” by excluding from the aforementioned
category “those instances of discrimination against an
individual who at the time of the discriminatory act was
affected by the genetic disease.”20 They did not, however, define
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 477-78.
18. Id. at 478.
19. Id. at 477. Essentially the same understanding of “genetic
discrimination” is adopted in Geller et al., supra note 5, at 72, and Lovejoy,
supra note 5, at 874 n.8.
20. Billings et al., supra note 5, at 477.
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the concept of discrimination simpliciter.
The authors’ failure to define the concept of discrimination
allowed them to include under the rubric “discrimination” acts
based on real or perceived differences from what is considered
to be normal—in this case the normal human genome. I
therefore assume that they defined “discrimination” as an
action that (i) is based on real or perceived differences from a
certain standard, and (ii) is unfavorable to the person who
deviates from that standard.
But such behavior is not
necessarily discrimination, and it should not be portrayed as
such.
4. DISCRIMINATION
I propose the following definition of the concept of
discrimination: one person, A, discriminates against another
person, B, if, and only if, A intentionally treats B worse than A
treats, or would treat, others in similar circumstances.21 On
this analysis, discrimination involves an intentional breach of
the principle of formal justice, which asks us to treat like cases
alike (and different cases differently).22
This definition captures the widely shared idea that
discrimination involves basing one’s decision on morally
irrelevant reasons, as the cases must be alike in morally
relevant respects. Discrimination thus conceived is morally
wrong, as we expect it to be. More specifically, if an action (or
action-type) is discriminatory in this sense, one has a pro tanto
moral duty not to perform it.23
I think of the proposed definition as an explication of the
concept of discrimination as understood in ordinary usage.24 To
21. When I say that A treats B worse than he treats others in similar
circumstances, I mean that A causes B harm over and above the unfairness
that consists in breaching the principle of formal justice. On my analysis, the
alleged harm is harm if, and only if, it would be considered harm by most
people. For more on this topic, see Lena Halldenius, Discrimination: What Is
It and How Is It Bad? 1-3, 11-2 (unpublished paper, on file with the author).
22. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 155-56 (1961); NEIL
MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 73-99 (1st ed. 1978)
(explaining the concept of formal justice); see also Kenneth I. Winston,
Treating Like Cases Alike, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1974).
23. As Shelley Kagan explains, “[a] pro tanto reason has genuine weight,
but nonetheless may be outweighed by other considerations.” SHELLEY
KAGAN, THE LIMITS OF MORALITY 17 (1989).
24. See, e.g., OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 183 (1980) (defining
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explicate a concept is to transform a vague and/or ambiguous
“pre-theoretical” concept, explicandum, into one that is more
exact, explicatum, while retaining its intuitive content.
Explication makes the concept more functional for a certain
purpose—in this case to transform “discrimination” into a
useful tool in moral, political, or legal thinking generally. Such
a reconstruction is of course partly prescriptive.25
Nevertheless, I believe that on the whole my definition is in
keeping with ordinary usage.
Shelley v. Kraemer26 presents us with a clear case of
discrimination thus conceived.
The case concerns the
constitutional validity of judicial decisions enforcing so-called
restrictive covenants, that is, private agreements between
property owners to exclude members of a designated race from
the ownership or occupancy of real estate. In 1911, a number
of property owners in St. Louis signed an agreement not to sell
their property “for resident or other purpose [to] people of the
Negro or Mongolian Race.”27 In August 1945, a black couple,
Mr. and Mrs. Shelley, unaware of the covenant, bought
property in the restricted neighborhood.28 In October 1945, a
group of property owners brought suit, requesting that Mr. and
Mrs. Shelley be restrained from taking possession and divested
of title.29 The Shelleys objected that judicial enforcement of a
restrictive covenant would violate their rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment, which provides, inter alia, that no
state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”30 The Supreme Court held that judicial
enforcement of restrictive covenants does violate the equal
protection clause.31

“discriminate” as “to make a distinction, to give unfair treatment, especially
because of prejudice”); CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY 430 (11th ed. 2004)
(defining “discriminate” as to “make an unjust distinction in the treatment of
different categories of people, especially on the grounds of race, sex, or age”);
SVENSKA AKADEMIENS ORDLISTA (11th ed. 1986) (Swed.) (defining
“discrimination” as “unfavorable special treatment,” in Swedish: ogynnsam
särbehandling).
25. See TORBEN SPAAK, THE CONCEPT OF LEGAL COMPETENCE: AN ESSAY
IN CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 26-48 (1994).
26. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
27. Id. at 5.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 6.
30. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
31. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 23.
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Clearly, the very idea of a restrictive covenant is
discriminatory. Such an agreement is designed to exclude
certain people from the ownership of property on the basis of
their race, although race must surely be considered an
irrelevant characteristic in regard to property transactions.
Under the proposed definition of discrimination,
affirmative action plans necessarily discriminate against
applicants who are not accorded preferential treatment under
the plan in question.32 Such plans are designed to favor the
members of one group, A, over the members of another group,
B, even though the members of A are less qualified in the
relevant respect than the members of B.33 Defenders of
affirmative action often argue that “diversity” on campus or in
the workforce is so important that we are justified in according
preferential treatment to members of a minority group.34 But
even if—incredibly—“diversity” were important,35 applicants
who are not accorded preferential treatment under the plan
would still be discriminated against.
This article’s concept of discrimination differs significantly
from the concept of discrimination used by Billings and his
colleagues. Whereas they maintain that the decisionmaker
must not take into account any facts about a person’s genetic
make-up, I argue that discrimination does not occur if such
facts are relevant to the decision.
My definition is preferable for two reasons. First, if the

32. One would expect those who speak of reverse or compensatory
discrimination to share this view. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, Equal Treatment
and Compensatory Discrimination, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 348 (1973); George
Sher, Justifying Reverse Discrimination in Employment, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
159 (1975). But see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 223 (2d. ed.
1978).
33. Lena Halldenius maintains that affirmative action does not qualify as
discrimination under this definition, as it does not involve an intent to harm.
Specifically, she maintains that the harm done to those who lose out under an
affirmative action plan is just an “unintended side effect.” See Halldenius,
supra note 21, at 13. But that cannot be right. To benefit one person under
an affirmative action plan is to harm another person. This is a conceptual
necessity, not an empirical contingency. Hence it is not an “unintended side
effect.”
34. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-19 (1977); see also
RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 386-426 (2000).
35. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
notion of “diversity” and its use to justify affirmative action measures).
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facts considered are relevant to a decision, the decisionmaker is
not necessarily guilty of moral wrongdoing. Second, under
Billings’s understanding of discrimination, a movie director
who casts a white man in the role of, say, Abraham Lincoln
discriminates against nonwhites and women. But in that case
race and sex would be relevant!
The concept of discrimination that I present also differs
from the concept used by Ronald Dworkin and others. I have
defined the concept of discrimination, in part, in terms of an
intention to breach the principle of formal justice. I have not
addressed the discriminating party’s motivation, the reason(s)
why an actor intends his or her action. In particular, I have
not argued that discrimination presupposes invidious intent.
But Ronald Dworkin adopts precisely that stance. He
maintains that the term discrimination is commonly used to
designate classifications that are invidious, in that they are
arbitrary, or reflect prejudice or favoritism:
Against the background of centuries of malign racial discrimination,
phrases like “discriminate against someone because of race” or
“deprive someone of an opportunity because of race” may be used in a
neutral . . . sense, so that any racial classification whatsoever is
included. Or they may be used (and I think are commonly used) in an
evaluative way, to mark off racial classifications that are invidious,
because they reflect a desire to put one race at a disadvantage against
another, or arbitrary, because they serve no legitimate purpose, or
reflect favoritism, or because they treat members of one race with
more concern than members of another.36

The difference between my understanding of the concept of
discrimination and Dworkin’s understanding is important. On
my understanding, affirmative action plans necessarily
discriminate against applicants who are not accorded
preferential treatment. On Dworkin’s analysis, such plans do
not necessarily discriminate as the element of prejudice,
contempt, or favoritism is typically lacking.37
Dworkin’s concept of discrimination is neither more
consistent with ordinary usage nor otherwise preferable to my
understanding of that concept. I maintain that the intentional
36. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 316, 318 (1985); see also
Joe R. Feagin & Douglas Lee Eckberg, Discrimination: Motivation, Action,
Effects, and Context, 6 AM. REV. SOC. 1 (1980) (analyzing such prejudicemotivated discrimination).
37. Not surprisingly, on Dworkin’s analysis, supra note 36, few of the
instances of “discrimination” identified by Billings et al., supra note 5, would
count as discrimination, as the element of prejudice, contempt, or favoritism is
typically lacking in such cases.
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breach of the principle of formal justice, not the reason for the
breach, is the important point. Being told that this principle
was breached not for reasons of prejudice, contempt, or
favoritism, but for “diversity” or some other reason, will not
placate anyone who has been rejected because somebody else
was accorded preferential treatment.38 The person who was
rejected is most concerned that he or she lost out in competition
with someone less qualified, that he or she was just a pawn in
the game, as it were.
I would like to address the requirement of intent and the
relevance requirement in my proposed definition of
discrimination. As I have said, discrimination involves an
intentional breach of the principle of formal justice. But why
not allow a negligent breach of the principle to qualify as
discrimination? Consider a case in which an employer hires a
less qualified male engineer instead of a better qualified female
engineer because he believes that women simply should not be
employed outside the home. On the employer’s analysis, a
person’s sex is a relevant consideration with respect to
employment outside the home, and a male and a female
applicant can never be in similar circumstances with regard to
such employment. Since we can safely say that the employer is
mistaken about what factors are relevant and what factors are
irrelevant in this case, the employer does not intentionally
breach the principle of formal justice. But we may say that the
employer is negligent, as the employer fails to realize that
there is no solid basis for the assumption that women should
not be employed outside the home. However, a negligent
breach of the principle of formal justice will not qualify as
discrimination under the proposed definition of discrimination.
But, one might object, surely the employer has discriminated
against the female applicant!
I do not agree. The distinction between intentional and
negligent action is morally relevant, as is clear from common
sense morality and the differential punishment that all
governments attach to intentional and negligent crimes. Since
discrimination is a fairly grave form of moral wrongdoing,
38. See Owen M. Fiss, The Fate of an Idea Whose Time Has Come:
Antidiscrimination Law in the Second Decade After Brown v. Board of
Education, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 742, 763 (1974) (“[T]he unfairness to the
excluded individual is perhaps no different from the unfairness of ‘traditional’
discrimination”); see also DWORKIN, supra note 32, at 231.
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negligent discrimination does not seem to be sufficiently
harmful to qualify as discrimination. I also doubt whether a
wider definition of discrimination would be in keeping with
ordinary usage.
I now turn to the relevance requirement. Discrimination,
as I have said, involves an intentional breach of the principle of
formal justice, and the relevance requirement ensures that the
parties involved are alike in relevant respects. But the
relevance requirement is not without its problems.
Consider, for example, the case of a grossly immoral
practice, such as the persecution of Jews in the Third Reich,
apartheid in South Africa, or “land reform” in Zimbabwe.
While race or ethnic origin is clearly relevant to these practices,
one could not reasonably maintain that no discrimination has
occurred. However, when I maintain that a person’s genetic
make-up, sex, race, or ethnic origin might be relevant, I have in
mind activities that are morally legitimate, such as running a
business, a university, or a sports team, or shooting a movie.
Admittedly, I have done nothing to explain which practices are
legitimate and why they are legitimate. There is a good deal of
agreement about which practices are legitimate and which are
not. While there will no doubt be borderline cases, they will be
rather few and insignificant.
Consider also the less dramatic case of a shop owner who
prefers to hire white staff because he correctly predicts that his
customers would stop frequenting his shop if he hired black
staff. Running a shop is obviously a perfectly moral activity,
and although the owner correctly judges the likely
consequences of hiring staff of the “wrong” color, many people
would nevertheless maintain that the owner is guilty of
discrimination. I do not agree. The owner is simply adjusting
to the situation and acting accordingly. In this case race is a
morally relevant factor, which means that the shop owner’s
behavior does not qualify as discrimination under my proposed
definition of discrimination.
One might, however, object that race is one of a limited
number of factors that are generally considered to be morally
irrelevant in most circumstances, and therefore race cannot be
a morally relevant factor in this case. At some point we must
allow moral considerations about relevance to trump
considerations about relevance based on self-interest. But at
what point? The answer will depend on whether we are
concerned with an activity in the private sector or with an
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activity in the public sector. Crudely put, the idea would be
that a business operating in the private sector may “adjust to
the situation,” whereas an organization operating in the public
sector may not.
Consider furthermore the case of homosexual marriages.
In most countries, the law does not recognize homosexual
marriages.
Does this mean that homosexuals are
discriminated against in regard to marriage? On my analysis,
the answer depends on whether lawmakers are morally
justified in insisting that only a man and a woman can marry
each other. If they are, a homosexual and a heterosexual
couple are not alike in relevant respects; therefore homosexuals
are not discriminated against. If lawmakers are not morally
justified, then a homosexual and a heterosexual couple are
alike in relevant respects, and homosexuals are discriminated
against.39 Of course, the moral relevance of a person’s sex in
regard to marriage is, and is likely to remain, a controversial
moral question in many countries. Since this is so, it will be
difficult to decide whether this is a case of discrimination.
Consider, finally, a Swedish case—Skattefjällsmålet—that
demonstrates how difficult it can be to determine who belongs
to the relevant reference group.40 In this case, the members of
a certain minority population claimed the government
discriminated against them in violation of the Swedish
Constitution with respect to the granting of hunting and
fishing rights. On my analysis, the government discriminates
against the members of this minority population if, and only if,
it intentionally treats them worse than it treats others in
similar circumstances. But who are those “others” in this case?
Members of another minority population, members of the
general public, or perhaps members of some other group? The
Swedish Supreme Court seized the first option and declared
that the government was not guilty of discrimination because
there was no alternative minority population available. But it

39. I thank Niclas Berggren for drawing my attention to the case of
homosexual marriages.
40. Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv [NJA] [Supreme Court] 1981 p.1 (Swed.). The
relevant provision in the Swedish Constitution (Regeringsformen 2:15) reads
as follows: “No Act or law or other statutory instrument may entail the
discrimination of any citizen because he belongs to a minority on grounds of
race, skin color, or ethnic origin.” Regeringsormen 2:15 (author’s translation),
available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/sw00000_.html.
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is not clear why the Court compared the appellant minority
population with another minority population and not with the
situation of the general public.41
5. DISCRIMINATION AND THE RECHTSSTAAT
I have argued that discrimination amounts to an
intentional breach of the principle of formal justice. I shall now
argue that discrimination thus conceived violates an important
value of the Rechtsstaat, or the rule of law. Let me elaborate on
this.
The Swedish legal theorist Åke Frändberg finds the core
value of what he calls the ideology of the Rechtsstaat in the
idea of protecting the individual against the coercive power of
the state.42 He explains that individuals need protection from
particularly grave infractions perpetrated by state organs, such
as discrimination, caprice, violence, and the absence of legal
appeal mechanisms. On Frändberg’s analysis, each type of
infraction violates a distinct value, namely legal equality, legal
certainty, legal security, and access to law, respectively.
Frändberg makes a distinction between equality before the
law, which means the uniform application of the relevant legal
norm, and equality in the law, which means that the
application of the relevant legal norms will not unduly
discriminate against anyone.43 He further explains that legal
equality, understood as a Rechtsstaat value, covers both types
of equality. Equality before the law is closely related to the
principle of formal justice. To apply a legal norm uniformly is
to apply it precisely to those cases to which, properly
understood, the norm applies. Accordingly, violation of the
value equality before the law necessarily amounts to
discrimination.
But because Frändberg does not explain
“undue” discrimination, we do not know what constitutes
equality in the law. Hence we do not know whether the
violation of equality in the law necessarily amounts to
discrimination.
Discriminatory action therefore violates an important

41. See Thomas Bull, Diskriminering och dekonstruktion: om positiv
faderskapstalan, 3-4 TIDSSKRIFT FÖR RETTSVITENSKAP 693, 713, 718-19 (2000)
(Swed.).
42. Åke Frändberg, Begreppet rättsstat, RÄTTSSTATEN – RÄTT, POLITIK
OCH MORAL 21, 24 (Fredrik Sterzel ed., 1996).
43. Id. at 29.
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Rechtsstaat value, namely legal equality, if and to the extent
that it occurs in the application, or administration—as
distinguished from the creation—of law. In other words,
discriminatory action necessarily violates the Rechtsstaat value
that Frändberg calls equality before the law, but not
necessarily the Rechtsstaat value that he calls equality in the
law. Accordingly, the very existence of, say, an affirmative
action plan does not violate the value equality in the law,
though its inconsistent administration might violate the value
of equality before the law. Though European writers speak of
the Rechtsstaat44 and English-speaking writers speak of the
rule of law,45 the terms designate very similar ideas.46
6. “GENETICISM”
Susan Wolf maintains that the rubric “genetic
discrimination”—which she understands in the broader sense
accepted by Billings and his colleagues—is “woefully
inadequate” to deal with what she calls genetic disadvantage. 47
She argues that we ought instead to conceive of the harm done
to people with genetic “defects” as something broader than
discrimination, “as rather the use of genetic notions to privilege
some individuals and subordinate others.”48 This, she explains,
is “geneticism.”
The problem with “current antidiscrimination theory,”
Wolf argues, is that it supports the idea that those who do not
suffer genetic disadvantage are “normal,” and that the goal is
to ensure that everyone is treated in the same way as the
members of the “normal” group. She interprets prevailing
theory as prescribing an antidiscrimination approach that
“counsels that people of color should be treated like whites and
that women should be treated like men.”49 Such an approach,

44. See, e.g., HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 313-14 (Max Knight
trans., Univ. of California Press 1967) (2d. ed. 1960); Frändberg, supra note
42.
45. DAVID LYONS, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW (1984); JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 235-43 (1971); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 21019 (1979).
46. See Neil MacCormick, Der Rechtsstaat und die Rule of Law, 2
JURISTENZEITUNG 65 (1984).
47. Wolf, supra note 6, at 45.
48. Id. at 346 (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 347.

SPAAK_FINAL.DOC

2006]

05/19/2006 12:41:48 PM

GENETIC DISCRIMINATION

653

she continues, “bifurcates the world into those who
nonproblematically fit the norm (whites, men) and those who
are problematically different (people of color, women). In
genetic terms, this means bifurcating the world into those with
nonproblematically ‘normal’ genotypes and those with
problematically ‘abnormal’ ones.”50
I doubt whether anyone “makes use of genetic notions to
privilege some individuals and subordinate others.” Rather,
employers, insurance companies, and others make business
decisions on the basis of genetic information, decisions that
may negatively affect people with genetic “defects.” On the
understanding of discrimination adopted by Billings and his
colleagues, such behavior tends to qualify as discrimination.
On my understanding and that of Dworkin, this behavior does
not qualify as discrimination.
If I understand Wolf correctly, she objects to calling this
discrimination since doing that would involve “bifurcating” the
world in a way that harms people with genetic “defects.” But
even if it would, which I doubt, I cannot see how introducing
the concept of “geneticism” would be likely to improve the
situation for those harmed. For whereas “geneticism” seems to
presuppose intent to harm on the part of the actor,
discrimination as the concept is understood by Billings and his
colleagues does not. It will therefore be easier to prove the
occurrence of discrimination as understood by Billings and his
colleagues than the occurrence of “geneticism.” Of course, this
would not neutralize the harm identified by Wolf, a harm which
I doubt exists, but it would do something for those harmed.
As Wolf points out, she is inspired by the literature on race
and gender.51 But a problem with this literature, at least as
interpreted by Wolf, is that it consistently and mistakenly
attributes to antidiscrimination legislation the purpose of
producing a higher ratio of female or colored professors,
members of Congress, or CEOs.52 That is to say, it endorses a
result-oriented—as distinguished from a process-oriented—
conception of antidiscrimination laws. As Owen Fiss explains:
Antidiscrimination laws are capable of two basic interpretations. One
interpretation–call it process-oriented–emphasizes the purification of
the decisional process. The prohibition against discrimination is
interpreted as a ban against basing a decision on certain forbidden

50. Id. at 347-48 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 345.
52. Id. at 348.
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criteria, for example, an individual’s race. A second interpretation–
call it result-oriented–emphasizes the achievement of a certain result,
improvement of the economic and social position of the protected
group. For example, under the result-oriented approach, the
obligation imposed by the antidiscrimination laws in public education
and housing is not to refrain from racial assignment but rather to
achieve racial integration. Under a fair employment law the
obligation is not to refrain from taking an applicant’s race into
consideration but rather to eliminate Black unemployment and
under-employment.53

The problem with the result-oriented conception of
antidiscrimination laws is that it presupposes that the
attainment of a certain result can be understood as a claim of
justice.54 But if the process is fair, which is what the processoriented conception of antidiscrimination laws is meant to
ensure, why is the result not fair? The idea seems to be that job
applicants who are members of certain “protected” groups can
claim as a matter of justice that they be hired even though they
are less qualified than other applicants. Jobs seem to be
considered goods that ought to be distributed equally, or
perhaps according to need, among the members of different
groups. But that is absurd! Whereas one might argue that
basic education, health care, and perhaps life insurance are
goods in the relevant sense, one cannot reasonably argue that
jobs are such goods. Instead, jobs should be “distributed”
according to the principles of a free market.
7. HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES
I have argued that one person, A, discriminates against
another person, B, if, and only if, A intentionally treats B worse
than A treats, or would treat, others in similar circumstances
as B, and that therefore much of what passes for genetic
discrimination is not discrimination at all.
Nonetheless,
decisionmaking based on genetic information is not without its
problems. As I see it, the main moral problem is simply that
such decisionmaking may give rise to harmful consequences for
those affected. For example, they may not be able to get health
or life insurance, or they may not be able to get a job (at least
not the job they want). We have ample reason to provide legal
protection for the “genetically disadvantaged” just as we have
53. Fiss, supra note 38, at 764.
54. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 150-55 (1974)
(discussing the relation between process and result).
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reason to provide legal protection for those who are unable to
compete on the job market, fall ill, or simply get old. The exact
nature of the consequences will of course depend on the system
of social security in force at the time, among other things.
Since this is so, problems of “genetic disadvantage” may be less
urgent in Sweden, say, than in the United States.

